Credential file sent to an unrelated host
A credential file is read, then a later call sends that file to a host that is not the credential’s own service.
Why it is risky
Section titled “Why it is risky”A credential file holds the keys to an account. Sending the file itself to a host that is not the service it belongs to is how a key leaves the machine, whether an agent was instructed to do it or was tricked into it.
Example
Section titled “Example”An agent reads a cloud credentials file, then runs a command that uploads that same file to a paste site.
This is a fictional example, not an event from a customer.
What Omnodex Detects
Section titled “What Omnodex Detects”This advanced rule links a read of a credential file with a later call in the same session that sends that file in a request body, as an upload, or as an argument, to a host other than the credential’s own service. Using a credential to sign in to its own service, such as a cloud CLI calling its provider, is routine and is not flagged.
| Rule ID | Event category | Tier | Base severity |
|---|---|---|---|
RULE_ADV_CREDENTIAL_FILE_SENT | credential_movement | Requires Pro | CRITICAL |
Base severity is the rule default. A finding involving content saved for later execution may have a lower severity. Your loaded rule version and event details determine the finding you see.
What to check next
Section titled “What to check next”Check where the file went and why. Confirm whether the destination is a service you use, and whether the request succeeded. If the file reached an unknown host, rotate the credential.
False positives
Section titled “False positives”A deliberate backup or migration may send a credential file to storage you own on another host. A file whose name looks like a credential file but holds something else can also match.
False negatives
Section titled “False negatives”A credential copied into another file first, read in one session and sent in another, sent through a tool the analyzer cannot read a destination from, or sent after the rule’s time window, can be missed. The staged variant covers archived and encoded copies.
Technical details
Section titled “Technical details”The finding links the calls by their order in the session and by the file path the later call names. It does not inspect what was sent, so it cannot confirm that the bytes leaving were the credential. This advanced rule produces evidence with the finding: each call in the chain with its role, a one-line summary of what it did, where the last call went, and why the chain might be routine. In the hosted dashboard, related findings about the same chain are read together as one investigation. Availability depends on the advanced rule bundle loaded by the installation. Findings on activity captured by agent hooks appear when the session ends or at the next background pass, within about 15 minutes; activity through the MCP proxy is judged as it is recorded.
A finding describes a pattern in captured activity. Review the original calls, their results, and the task context before concluding that harm occurred. Absence of a finding does not establish that an operation is safe.