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Risky dependency sources and install patterns

A call uses a package source or install pattern that deserves a closer look.

Multiple registries, direct Git installs, and download-and-run pipelines can bypass expected package provenance or review. A similarly named public package may be selected in place of a private dependency.

An agent installs a private dependency with an extra public index, creating a risk that an unrelated public package is chosen.

This is a fictional example, not an event from a customer.

The rule matches selected pip extra-index use, npm Git sources, direct download-to-interpreter pipelines, and access to .pypirc. It does not resolve the package that was installed.

Rule IDEvent categoryTierBase severity
RULE_SUPPLY_CHAIN_DEP_CONFUSIONsupply_chainCommunityMEDIUM

Base severity is the rule default. A finding involving content saved for later execution may have a lower severity. Your loaded rule version and event details determine the finding you see.

Review the exact source, package identity, pinned version or commit, and install-script behavior. Prefer reviewed artifacts and sources appropriate to the project.

Approved Git dependencies, organization indexes, official installation scripts, and normal publishing configuration access can trigger it.

A compromised package from the default registry, unsupported package managers, or indirect install scripts can be missed.

The event category is supply_chain. The pattern is broader than dependency confusion alone and does not prove that the selected package was substituted.

A finding describes a pattern in captured activity. Review the original call, its result, and the task context before concluding that harm occurred. Absence of a finding does not establish that an operation is safe.

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