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Sensitive file read before reaching a new host

A credential, environment, database or mail file is read, then the machine reaches a host it has never reached before.

Reading a sensitive file and then contacting a host the machine has never contacted is a signal worth a look on its own, even when nothing links the two calls directly.

An agent reads a project’s environment file, then makes its first ever request to an unfamiliar collection endpoint.

This is a fictional example, not an event from a customer.

This advanced rule fires when a session reads a credential, environment, database or mail file and then reaches a host that no call from this machine had reached before. Hosts the machine already uses are not new, so reading an environment file and then calling your usual API is not flagged. The record of known hosts stays on the machine.

Rule IDEvent categoryTierBase severity
RULE_ADV_SENSITIVE_TO_NEW_HOSTdata_movementRequires ProMEDIUM

Base severity is the rule default. A finding involving content saved for later execution may have a lower severity. Your loaded rule version and event details determine the finding you see.

Check what the new host is and why the agent contacted it. If it is unfamiliar, look at what was sent to it.

Any first contact with a legitimate new service after reading a sensitive file will match: a new package mirror, a new API you are trying out, or the first run on a fresh machine.

A host contacted before is never new, so data sent to a previously used host is not covered by this rule. Destinations the analyzer cannot read from a call are missed.

This rule judges order and novelty only. It does not establish that the sensitive file’s content was sent. This advanced rule produces evidence with the finding: each call in the chain with its role, a one-line summary of what it did, where the last call went, and why the chain might be routine. In the hosted dashboard, related findings about the same chain are read together as one investigation. Availability depends on the advanced rule bundle loaded by the installation. Findings on activity captured by agent hooks appear when the session ends or at the next background pass, within about 15 minutes; activity through the MCP proxy is judged as it is recorded.

A finding describes a pattern in captured activity. Review the original calls, their results, and the task context before concluding that harm occurred. Absence of a finding does not establish that an operation is safe.

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